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This paper evaluates the use of risk-neutral probability density functions implied in 3-
month interest-rate futures options to assess market perceptions regarding future monetary
policy moves options allow the information content implied in simpler derivatives to be
extended by providing indicators for asymmetry and extreme values. First, a cubic spline
is implemented to evaluate the densities. Second, the methodology is applied to quotes on
deposits denominated in USdollars, euros and sterling fromJanuary 1999 to May 2004 results
show that markets correctly forecast the monetary easing of 2001 in the United States in the
course of the second half of 2000, but not in the euro area and the United Kingdom. The
evidence for the tightening cycle of 1999 is mixed: markets expected an increase in euro
area policy rates at the beginning of 1999 expectations were less clear for the United States’
interest-rate increases. In the case of the United Kingdom the increase was not foreseen.
JEL classication: C52, E58, G13, G14, G15
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1
The widespread use and the availability of data of derivatives on short-term interest rates
has widened the scope for analyzing the expectations regarding monetary policy decisions
prevailing among market participants. This analysis has recently been developed within the
research departments of central banks and is extensively used to extract information about
market forecasts and market sentiment on future monetary policy changes.
2 The use of a
simple futures contract with delivery date around the time of the monetary policy meeting has
already shown a persistent bias in predicting future interest rates furthermore, this kind of
derivative instrument can only give point estimates of the prevailing market rate at delivery.
Alternatively, options written on short-term interest-rate futures contract (hereafter futures
options or, more simply, options) can be used to evaluate market expectations regarding the
underlying and also to extract additional information on their dispersion, on the probability
attached to the occurrence of extreme events as well as on the relative probability of the
occurrence of a decrease compared with an increase in the underlying — in statistical terms
these three features are characterized by the implied standard deviation, the kurtosis and the
skewness of the densities. These features allow condence intervals to be constructed for the
underlying instrument at different delivery dates.
3
In order to understand why futures options give the opportunity to obtain condence
intervals it may be useful to consider a simple example. A quote on 14 October 2002 for an
American-type call option on the futures contract on the 3-month Euribor with expiration date
in March 2003 and discount strike price 95.00, gives the buyer the right to buy the underlying
4 I would liketo thank (in alphabetical order) CarlChiarella, NeilCooper, Antonio DiCesare, Fabio Fornari,
Paolo Guasoni, Andrea Lamorgese, Nikolaos Panigirtzouglou, Marco Taboga and seminar participants at the
Forecasting Financial Markets 2004 conference for comments and help obviously I alone am responsible for
any errors. The methodology used in this paper was developed during the summer of 2000 when the author was
visiting the Bank of England (Monetary Instruments and Market Division) and later at the Economic Research
Department of Bank of Italy. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily




5 For an extensive survey of the methodology used in central banks see Bank for International Settlements
(1999), Deutsche Bundesbank (1996) , Clews et al. (2000). For an application of the predictive power of interest
rate futures see Owens and Webb (2001).
6 Even if futures options and futures contracts on 3 month interest rate deposits are widely traded at CME,
LIFFE and EUREX, the bulk of derivatives on these instruments is still traded in the over-the-counter market
where interest caps and interest oors take the lion’s share. The main difference between an OTC and a regulated
market is that in the former derivatives are traded with a custom-made expiry date, while in the latter the expiry
date is xed.8
futures at any time before expiration at 95.00 (e.g. 100.0-95.0=5.0 per cent). Usually, every
day such options are quoted for several discount strike prices, e.g. 95.125, 95.25, 95.50
etc., and for different expiration dates. The tenet in option pricing for market practitioners
is given by the original Black-Scholes-Samuelson formula, which simply assumes that the
underlying asset follows a geometric Brownian motion with constant volatility and, hence,
the implied probability density function is log-normal.
4 However, even if the Black-Scholes-
Samuelson formula is widely used, each currently observed option shows different volatility,
which tends to be larger as the strike price moves further away from the underlying spot price
(this phenomenon is known as the smile of the option). Thus, the market assigns a higher
quote to the option if, for a given volatility of the underlying, it considers the occurrence of
the corresponding strike at the expiration date to be more likely. This creates the occurrence
of skewed distributions — since markets can assign different probabilities to the occurrence of
positive changes in the underlying compared with negative changes — and of fat-tails in the
distributions — since extreme events can be considered more likely.
There is a pervasive practice among practitioners to price options in terms of
implied Black-Scholes-Samuelson volatility instead of market prices, i.e. units of volatility
corresponding to options prices through the Black-Scholes-Samuelson formula. This practice
can be regarded as inconsistent since, on the one hand, markets quote options in terms of
Black-Scholes-Samuelson implied volatility and, on the other, volatility is not constant across
strike prices. Different theoretical models have been proposed to explain the ‘smile effect’
but, more interestingly for policy-makers and asset managers, the estimate of the connected
probability density function documents the beliefs of market participants about the underlying
datageneratingprocess(underthenontrivialassumptionofrisk-neutrality). Then, theshapeof
the smile provides an evaluation of the probability distribution that market participants assign
to the occurrence of a strike price at a certain date given the underlying spot price.
5
7 If  and EV are the observed and the Black-Scholes-Samuelson option prices respectively, the implied
volatility  is dened as the solution to EV where the terms in brackets are the underlying
price, the strike price, the time to maturity, the volatility and the risk free rate, respectively.
8 Another feature of observed options is that historical volatility is usually lower than the lowest implied
volatility(whichisusualyobservedforaroundat-the-moneyoptions). Thedifferencebetweenhistorical volatility
and at-the-money implied volatility is often used as a rst tool to assess market sentiment. In this sense, when
this difference increases, markets usually show higher kurtosis in their probability density functions and assign a
larger probability to the occurrence of extreme events.9
When this methodology is applied to derivatives on short-term interest rates it is
straightforward to use the ‘smile effect’ as a tool to assess the predictive power of market
participants in forecasting changes in policy interest rates at periodical central bank meetings.
The methodology developed here can be used to gauge whether, in the United States,
in the euro area and in the United Kingdom, derivatives markets have accurately predicted
monetary policy changes. Furthermore, these tools make it possible to test additional
hypotheses as to whether policy-makers have driven expectations or, alternatively, have been
driven by market sentiment.
6
The time series of probability density functions (hereafter s) implied in futures
options written onto 3-month interest rates on deposits denominated in US dollars, euros
and sterling may therefore provide relevant information about market expectations concerning
the moves of the monetary authorities before their periodical meetings. The aim is to assess
the degree of market participants’ accuracy in anticipating interest rate changes as well as to
gauge the impact of different communication strategies which can differently shape investor
sentiment. Statistics extracted from these s are used to evaluate their predictive power of
directives expected at the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) in the United States, at
the Governing Council meeting (GC) in the euro area and at the Monetary Policy Committee
(MPC) in the United Kingdom, respectively, from January 1999 to May 2002.
7
The novelty of this paper is the use of s to assess market perceptions of monetary
policy moves. In fact, the previous literature has only incidentally analyzed the predictive
9 According to so-called central-bank watchers, a comparative analysis of monetary policies in the United
Statesandintheeuroareashowsthat, since1999, ECBinterest-ratechangeshavenotbeencompletelyanticipated
by markets, while Federal Reserve changes were fully anticipated until the reversal of monetary stance in January
2001. Since 2001, monetary authorities in the United States, in the euro area and in the United Kingdom have
substantially eased their monetary stance, driving short-term rates to historical lows. However, according to
market commentary, the moves of the Federal Reserve have been different from those of the ECB since, in the
USmarket, agentsappeartohave anticipatedthe decisionsofthe Federal Reserveand seemtohave driveninterest
rates towards the desired values. This empirical regularity may either reect a deliberate decision of the Federal
Reserve to inuence expectations or a conditioning power of markets on the moves of monetary authorities. Even
if the direction in this causality relationship is uncertain given the endogeneity of the link between policy and
short-term rates, it is interesting to compare the US with the euro area where, conversely, this phenomenon has
not been observed, thus drawing criticism of the communication strategy adopted by the ECB.
: The FOMC is held eight times a year, although the President of the Federal Reserve system may call for
an intra-meeting in order to introduce additional policy-rate changes. The Governing Council of the European
Central Bank is held twice a month since 8 November 2001 decisions on policy rates are taken only at the rst
meeting of the month. The Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England lasts two days and is held every
Tuesday-Wednesday or Wednesday-Thursday during the rst week of every month.10
power of forward-looking securities with respect to interest-rate changes. Söderlind and
Svensson (1997) and Fornari and Violi (1998) compare the s of long term government
bond yield between different dates to extract also expectations regarding interest-rate changes
Joundeau and Rockinger (2000) compare different methods of evaluating s of exchange
rates at two dates corresponding to tranquil and turbulent periods in the foreign exchange
market, respectively. The Bank of England (2004, p. 9) presents charts with time series of the
skewness of the 6-month implied skew from interest-rate options for the US dollar, the euro
and the pound sterling.
I use a cubic spline to estimate the smile, hereafter dened as the relationship between
the volatility and the delta of the options. s are then computed with the Rubinstein
methodology by differentiating twice the estimated call with respect to the strike prices.
Estimates use end-of-day settlement data on three regulated markets: 3-month interest-rate
futures options are traded at CME, LIFFE and EUREX.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main stylized facts in the
money markets of the United States, the euro area and the United Kingdom. Section 3 reviews
the methodologies used to estimate s implied in options and the sub-section 3.3 presents
the non-parametric method I use. Section 4 shows the results rst a comparison among s
at different dates around selected central bank meetings is presented second, the time series
of some relevant  statistics are analyzed. Section 5 concludes. A description of the data is
presented in the Appendix.
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Since 1999 policy and short-term rates in the three areas have moved in synchrony, with
the United Kingdom slightly anticipating the other two areas. Central bank decisions for the
three areas are presented in Tables 2-4 in the Appendix. In the United States, from July 1999
the Federal Reservesteadily raised thepolicy rate(federal funds target rate) by 1.75 percentage
points up to 6.5 per cent in less than twelve months rates were left unchanged during the
second half of 2000 when doubts arose about the strength of growth of the US economy from
January 2001 until year end the policy rate was cut eleven times, by 4.75 percentage points,
down to 1.75 per cent, which is the lowest level since the 1950s. Table 1 also shows the ‘bias’11
oftheFederalReserve(orsinceFebruary2000the‘balanceofrisks’), that is aforward-looking
assessment of the likely future monetary moves, released jointly with the decision on interest-
rate changes it ranges from ‘easy’ to ‘neutral’ and to ‘tighter’. In the euro area, the policy rate
(the rate on main renancing operations) was fairly steady in 1999 and frome March 2000 was
increased by 1.75 points to 4.75 per cent from March 2001 the rate was cut four times until
year end, by 1.5 points. In the United Kingdom, the policy rate (rate on repurchase agreement
operations) was reduced by one point to 5 per cent between January and September 1999
thereafter, the buoyant British business cycle forced the monetary authority to raise the policy
rate back to 6 per cent by March 2000, months before the increase implemented in the United
States and in the euro area. Between March and December 2001 the rate was cut seven times
by a total of 2 percentage points.
Three-month interest rates followed policy rates in the three areas. In the last quarter
of 1999, when a quick tightening of monetary stance was in place, the slope of the money
market curve — measured by the difference between the 3-month and the policy rate —
signicantly steepened, signalling expectations of further increases in future policy rates.
The slope decreased substantially from January 2000, became at during 2000 and inverted
somewhat at the beginning of the rate cuts. What the money market slope documents then is
just a mechanical textbook example: it is steep during phases of tightening and at or inverted
during monetary stance easing.
Similarly, futures contracts on short-term interest-rate deposits in the three areas have
not provided good forecasts of future monetary policy moves for any areas.
From 1999 until the end of 2000, market participants assigned to the President of the
Federal Reserve a superior information knowledge with respect to that of the European Central
Bank Council. According to the nancial press and newsletters of the major investment banks,
in 1999 and 2000, in the US market the monetary authority drove short-term rates towards
the desired values. This phenomenon could be the outcome of the communication strategy
adopted by the Federal Reserve and of the transparency perceived by markets through the
press communiquésf r o m1 9 9 4  on the other hand, this could be the outcome of a leading
effect of money markets on the choice of the central bank. However, such a causal relationship
is hard to identify owing to endogeneity problems in the link between policy and short-term
rates. Conversely, in the euro area, where the judgement of analysts and market participants12
regarding monetary policy decisions has been more less favourable, critics have frequently
pointed out the failure of the monetary policy communication strategy, which has often tried
to surprise the markets with policy-rate changes.
The use of s implied in futures options may give useful insights for assessing this
issue and evaluating the sentiment of market participants about central bank moves and their
credibility.
(  )"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In this paper I use the following standard terminology:
–  is the underlying spot price
–  the strike price
–  the risk-neutral ,  the risk-neutral cumulative distribution function (hereafter


–  the normal ,  the normal cumulative distribution function
– ,  and     	 are, respectively, the current period, the expiration date and the
time to expiration as a percentage of the year
– 
 is the risk-free interest rate and 3o￿ is the non-stochastic time-homogenous discount
factor in continuous time between  and 
–  the current price of a call option and 
 the current price of a put option with payoff at
time  given by A n and  An, respectively, where n stands for 	

– ￿7 the Black-Scholes-Samuelson price of a call option is




























–  is the delta of the option, i.e. the sensitivity of the call to the underlying 	,






–  is the vega of the option, i.e. the sensitivity of the call to the volatility 	,w h i c h
in a Black-Scholes-Samuelson world is given by   ￿

13
– I assume that the 

 	 holds, i.e. there are no arbitrage opportunities between a
portfolio formed by one call option and 3o￿ of cash and one portfolio formed by one
put option and one unity of its underlying, namely  3o￿  
 . Then, put options
can be transformed into call options through   
    3o￿.
During the last ten years the literature on nancial econometrics and computational
methods in nance has extensively used the analysis of s implied in asset prices to
go beyond the simple Black-Scholes-Samuelson option pricing formula, a tenet in option
pricing. What the Black-Scholes-Samuelson model assumes is a constant variance for
different degree of moneyness.
8 Conversely, it is observed that options traded with different
degrees of moneyness have different volatilities and, moreover, that the assumption that the
underlying follows a simple or a geometric Brownian motion is too naive and does not give a
reasonable description of his distribution. In reality the volatility of the options has a nonlinear
relationship with the strike: call options show a negative relationship with their implied
volatility, while put options show a positive relationship. Thus, what is actually thought of
as a smile effect around the underlying spot price is the left tail of the call option schedule and
the right tail of the put option schedule, which correspond to out-of-the-money (OTM) calls
and puts, respectively. Implied volatility is as high as the strike is far from the underlying, both
OTM calls and OTM puts, and the minimum value is usually observed for OTM calls — see
Figure 1.
; We dene themoneynessasthe percentage spread of the strike price, , fromthe underlying spot price, ,
e.g.   	. Usually the moneyness can be measured by the delta () of the option: in-the-money options
have   , at-the-money options have   and out-of-the-money options have theoretically
  . In practice, one considers   for in-the-money options and  	 for out-of-the-




Estimates of s have strong advantages with respect to surveys, market polls and
simple futures strip analyses. First, s can be used to give not only point estimates, but
also condence interval estimates for the underlying price. Second, they show how market
expectations shift and, through the joint analysis of futures contracts at different expiration
dates, provide an evaluation of market sentiment. Last, their higher moments can add further
insights about the dispersion of market participants’ beliefs.
However, s are estimated under the assumption of risk-neutrality and, therefore,
cannot be directly related to ‘objective market probabilities’, although a precise mathematical
relation between them exists. In other words, the probability measure governing the risk-
neutral estimates implies that the movements of discounted underlying asset prices are
martingales, which is not true under the objective measure. Hence, in this framework the
underlying asset price does not depend upon the subjective preferences of market participants.
A way to compare the two densities and the risk aversion function is given in Aït-Sahalia
and Lo (1998).
9 Analogously, Coutant (1999) establishes a relationship between subjective
and risk-neutral  using an approximation with Hermite polynomials. What does this imply
< Let 
w>W be the stochastic discount factor between  and  dened as the ratio between the marginal
utilities at period  and , 
 and 
 the subjective distribution and density functions, respectively, dened over the
entire domain of the asset price  and ￿ the connected expectation operator. The pricing kernel is then given15
for risk-neutral  estimates? Approximately, one can say that the true objective  will
be slightly shifted towards the right with respect to the risk-neutral estimate. Söderlind and
Svensson (1997) show that, under the assumption that the asset price and the stochastic
discount factor are jointly log-normally distributed, the objective  can be obtained by
simply shifting to the right the risk-neutral  by the amount equal to the covariance between
the asset price and the stochastic discount factor. Aït-Sahalia et al. (2001) document how to
extract subjective s without introducing any assumption about the risk aversion function.
The literature presents two kinds of approaches in the  estimates: the parametric and
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The introduction of stochastic volatility in the Black-Scholes-Samuelson framework
allows the smile effect to be modelled parametrically. The simplest and tractable version
of stochastic volatility assumes the existence of a regime switching between two states of the
world which can be thought of as high and low volatility states. Then volatility and the drift
terms in the geometric Brownian motion are expected to follow a simple Bernoulli process
with probability . I also assume that there is no correlation between the Brownian motion
and the probability of being in a high or low volatility state. This framework allows skewed
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Then, the risk aversion function and the utility function, which determine the stochastic discount factor, are a key
factor in this relationship between subjective and risk neutral. Without introducing ad-hoc assumptions about the
form and the distribution of the stochastic discount factor it is not possible to recover a precise link between the
two functions.16
stochastic differential equation that follows
|
|





with    , 
with      ,  ,
where | and | are the risk-neutral drift and the variance of the process, respectively,  a
standard Wiener process. This is basically a Black-Scholes-Samuelson world with two states
of nature, and then the Black-Scholes-Samuelson formula applies in each state of nature and
the nal price of the option is an average of the two prices weighted by the probability of
the occurrence of a particular state of nature, i.e. ￿7||  ￿7￿￿   
￿722. The parameter vector to be estimated is then   ￿ 2￿2. The mixture
of two log-normal densities can be found through an optimization algorithm by minimizing
the error between current and Black-Scholes-Samuelson option prices. This procedure aims to
minimize the squared differences between the current price and that implied in its mix-density
given by the Black’s approximation, namely
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￿,w h e r e￿ is the number of options.
Given the estimated parameter values, option price s can be simulated for different
strike prices. Applications of this method are used in Bahra (1996), Fornari and Violi (1998),





Under the risk-neutral probability measure with   and 
 , assuming constant
interest rate and that  follows a Markov process, the price at time  of a call futures option 17

















    
analogously the price of a put option can be converted into a call option through the call-put
parity and dened in the same way. Then the implied risk-neutral  is obtained by double










Hence, numerical differentiation of the price of a call with respect to the strike price gives an
estimate of the implied . Methods based on equation (2) are employed by Aït-Sahalia and
Lo (1998), Malz (1997) and Neuhaus (1995). Cooper (2000) and Bliss and Panigirtzouglou
(2002) show through a Montecarlo simulation the superiority of the non-parametric approach
over the parametric one, since the former is more stable and invariant to outliers.
The basic difference between the two approaches is given by the assumption about the
distribution of the short-term interest rate given by equation (1). Model (1) is unrealistic
for interest rates more reasonable models which encompass mean reverting properties or
the possibility of modelling the term structure and the volatility term structure in a Heath-
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Jarrow-Morton framework would be more interesting.
11 However, when one departs from the
simplest models, estimates become very complicated and the larger structure does not allow
much exibility in the  shape, which sometimes becomes unrealistic. On the other hand,
the parametric approach provides estimates of the parameters which are necessary when one
is pricing the option through a Feynman-Kac partial differential equation. However, when
the  is uniquely intended as a tool to convey information on market expectations, the non-
parametric approach can be more useful and more exibile. In this work the focus is on the




My methodology departs somewhat from the standard non-parametric methods in order
to gain stability in its estimates: I move from the  space to the  space since in the
former the smile is very sensitive to deep ITM options. The rationale behind this choice can
be seen in Cooper (2000). Estimates are done through the following steps:
A. Quotes of put options written on interest-rate futures contracts are taken every day for a
given time horizon. In order to use the most liquid contracts only in-the-money (ITM)
and at-the-money (ATM) option quotes are used since they are more liquid moreover,
only put options are used since, given the discount quotes, they are equivalent to call
options, which are more liquid in this type of market, i.e. a put on a futures with discount
strike  is equivalent to a call on an interest-rate futures with strike  per cent.
































where  and  are redened as  minus the futures contract and the strike, respectively.
44 The simplest extension of equation (1) is given by the Ho-Lee model which emcompasses the basic fea-
tures of the Heath-Jarrow-Morton framework. Letbetheinstantaneousforwardinterest ratebetweenand












w. Note that when one considers only the  for one interest rate at a given point in the future,  becomes
a constant and the only difference from equation (1) is given by the slope of the forward curve between  and .
For an extensive application of parametric estimates in the Heath-Jarrow-Morton framework see Amin and Ng
(1997).19
B. The implied volatility, , for each option is found by minimizing through a Newton
Rapson method the module of the distance between the call price given by the
Black-Scholes-Samuelson formula and the current call price weighted by its vega,









12 American-type options are corrected with the
Barone-Adesi-Whaley methodology to apply the Black-Scholes-Samuelson formula. I
then obtain the volatility smile, i.e. the volatility as a function of the strike,   .
C. I pass from the  space to the  space by considering the approximation
￿ Put options with  larger than  and smaller than  are not considered
since very deep-ITM and deep-OTM futures options are very illiquid and can unnaturally
stress the skewness of the . The passage from the  space to the  space is
motivated by its stability with respect to the former.
13 Figure 2 suggests that an evaluation
of the smile through the strike/volatility (or also the strike/moneyness) schedule would
overweight the tails of the distributions, signalling the existence of humps for very far
from the money quotes. Alternatively, the delta/volatility schedule, cleaned of extreme
values, would give more ‘reasonable’ shapes for the .
D. The schedule between  and  is built by means of numerical interpolation.
The volatility is given by
  	    
   
2
where  is a cubic spline which gives a smooth piecewise polynomial interpolation
between  and  weighted by their vega  with 1,000 points.
E. Estimated volatility is plugged into the Black-Scholes-Samuelson formula to obtain the
option price, namely    ￿7 
F. The central second order derivatives of   give the risk-neutral ,n a m e l y







45 Similarly, the implied volatility given by the squared difference between the current and the





5, gives similar results.
46 Some authors consider the 	 space where 	 is the distance from its strike, i.e. its
moneyness, instead of the  space.
47 The central second order derivative is dened as 5	5  l.4  l 
 l￿4	
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The time series of the statistics of the s can be used to analyze changes in monetary
policy stance in the three areas.
15
A further caveat is in order. The Black-Scholes-Samuelson option formula is supposed
to hold for European-type options while options on 3-month interest-rate futures are of the
American type, i.e. they can be exercised at any time before expiration. A correction must
then be carried out to eliminate this bias. In this paper the Barone, Adesi and Whaley (1987)
correction is implemented. Alternatively, Fornari and Violi (1998) and Malz (1997) show
Black-Scholes-Samuelson estimates of American-type option s where a lower bound is
given for European-type  estimates.
In order to compare the statistics, estimated s should be re-scaled to a common
expiration date. In fact, the shape of the  for options traded on 15 May 2002 with expiration
date 16 September 2002 — with  equal to 0.34 — is different from that of options traded on
29 May 2002 with the same expiration date — with  equal 0.30 more precisely, longer dated
options tend to be more dispersed around the mean and have larger kurtosis. The Bank of
England (2001) adjusts the estimated s by interpolating the volatilities along the maturity
spectrum of the options. In this paper a simpler correction is implemented the implied
volatility is divided by

 at point 4 above. It can be shown that this method is empirically
equivalent to the one employed by the Bank of England (2001).
16
48 The statistics commonly used are: 	 the mean which is the expected value of the distribution and by
construction coincides with the futures current price, 		 the mode which is the most likely outcome, 			 the
medianwhichisthevaluethat assignsa50percentprobabilitytotheoccurrenceofthatoutcome,	 theskewness
which characterizes the distribution of probability on either side of the mean (a positively/negatively skewed
distribution is one for which there is more/less probability attached to outcomes higher than the mean than to
outcomes below the mean a normal distribution has a skew of zero),  the Pearson skewness which is given
by (mean-median)/standard deviation and has a similar interpretation to the simple skewness coefcient, 	 the
kurtosis which measures the fat tails or alternatively the peak of a distribution (it also measures the likelihood of
extreme outcomes: the greater the likelihood of extreme outcomes, the fatter the tails of the distribution and the
more peaked it is around the mean the normal distribution has a kurtosis equal to three). Note that kurtosis can
also be dened by   3=58 
 3=:8  3=83	3=83 and skewness by 3=58  3=:8	3=83,w h e r el stands
for the implied volatility computed for an option with  equal to . See Malz (1996 and 1997) for an application
to currency options.
49 In the example above, the volatilities of the rst options are divided by






Following Aït-Sahalia and Lo (1998) the relationship between  and  has been
estimated through a Epanitchev-kernel with optimal bandwidth call options have also been
introduced in addition to put options estimates for different time horizons have been
performed. Results do not differ.
 
    
4.1  
 	
As a case study I compare the s for the 3-month interbank eurodeposit interest rate
denominated in dollars, euros and sterling around the start of an inversion of the monetary
policy stance. In particular, the tightening cycle started at the end of June 1999 in the United
States, on 4 November 1999 in the euro area and on 8 September 1999 in the United Kingdom
the easing cycle started on 3 January 2001 in the United States, on 10 May 2001 in the euro
area and on 8 March 2001 in the United Kingdom. For three dates around these episodes (two
before and one after) s are estimated with a constant 90-day horizon – see Figures 3,4,5.
   		
In the United States the market was taken completely by surprise by the increase decided
at the FOMC on 29 June 1999, which, furthermore, in the following days was perceived as
isolated and not as the rst of many — see the top panel of Figure 3. On 1 June 1999, the 3-
month eurodollar spot ratewas atpercent and the futures contract with delivery at September
1999 quoted at around ￿
e moreover, the  did show a negative skewness. Two weeks later
the shift inthe  mean and thedecrease in theskewness showthat markets were expecting an
increasein short-term rates that was not signalled by thespot short ratequotes, which remained
fairly steady. Two weeks after the increase of 0.25 percentage points market sentiment was
slightly oriented towards additional increases (as shown by the shape of the  on 12 July
and by its skewness) but the subsequent 1.5 point rise which took place by May 2000 was nor
expected. The additional ve increases in federal funds target rates neither shifted the s nor
affected their skewness in the following month (not shown).23
In the euro area the increase on 4 November 1999 was widely anticipated by agents —
see the top panel of Figure 4.
17 The  of 1 October 1999 had shown a large positive skewness
slightly below 1.0 since the end of the summer. On 20 October the market perceptions were for
a 3-month rate of around 3.75 per cent one week after the increase perceptions were stable,
if less dispersed around the mean. The skewness continued to remain large and pointed to
additional rate increases.
In the United Kingdom the increase in the repo rate on 8 September 1999 was also
anticipated by the markets: on 2 August 1999 the  was skewed to the left, assigning a larger
probability to the occurrence of an increase in short-term rates — see the top panel of Figure
5. On 25 August the  shifted to the left, thus signalling an increase in the uncertainty of
agents. Oneweekaftertherateincreasethedistributionmovedmarkedlytotheright, recording
an additional increase in its skewness. Markets assigned a large likelihood to the occurrence
of additional rate increases.
   	
The starting date of cuts in US policy rates (FOMC on 3 January 2001) was partially
anticipated by market participants. The s started to show a negative skewness (lower rates
are deemed more probable) from the beginning of the last quarter of 2000 — see the bottom
panel of Figure 3. Thus, the direction of short-term rates was expected even if the size of
the decrease was not. On 15 December 2000, about three weeks before the Federal Reserve
decision, the expected 3-month rate was below 6 per cent and the skewness was even more
negative. After the decision had been taken, on 16 January 2001, market perception was of a
substantial additional cut in policy rates (shown by a decrease in skewness as well as by the
expected 3-month rate).
In the euro area, conversely, the monetary easing cycle on 10 May 2001 seems not to
have been anticipated by the markets — see the bottom panel of Figure 4. In the course of the
month preceding the GC meeting, from 4 to 25 April 2001, the  shifted to the right, even
if the skewness decreased somewhat below zero. Moreover, one week after the decision had
been taken, perceptions were almost unchanged.
4: In this analysis I do not consider the possibility that the increase in the US policy rate could have affected
the decisions in the euro area and the United Kingdom.24
In the United Kingdom the decrease in the repo rate decided on 8 March 2001 was
unexpected — see the bottom panel of Figure 5. The two s of 1 and 23 February 2001 are
identical after the cut the dispersion increased substantially but the skewness remained steady
around nil, signalling that the market was assigning the same probability to either move around
the mean.
Results show that market participants did not expect the tightening monetary cycle in
the United States and the additional policy-rate moves in 1999. The easing cycle of 2001 was
largely anticipated and markets may have played a role in ‘driving’ US central bank decisions,
since the distributions rapidly shifted to the left, showing that a business cycle slowdown was
widely expected. In the euro area, agents had less clearer perceptions the tightening cycle of
1999 was partly anticipated even if its duration was not expected the easing cycle of 2001
was completely unexpected and, conversely, an increase seemed to be expected after the rst
rate cut. The uncertainty about the recovery in the euro area business cycle could have also
contributed to this misperception. In the United Kingdom the rate increases of 1999 were
not expected, the cuts only modied the uncertainty of market participants about successive
monetary moves.
4.2  	 	 	
In order to go beyond the simple comparison of s at two dates around the central
bank meeting, the time series of the  statistics have also been evaluated. These time
series allow the dynamics of market sentiment during the sample period to be evaluated.
I calculate the time series for the implied ATM volatility, the skewness, the kurtosis, the
probability of a decrease of over  percentage points in the interest rate and that of an
increase of over  percentage points, for the three areas.
18 The skewness and the probability
of an upward/downward move give the most straightforward intuition of the link between rate
4; T h es k e w n e s si sd e ned as the ratio between the third central moment and the standard deviation to the
power of three, i.e. 6	6, the kurtosis as 7	7. The probability of a decrease in the interest rate by over
 percentage points is dened as       ,w h e r e is the interest rate and  is its
average. Analogously, the probability of an increase of over  percentage points is dened as   
     
 .25
changes and market expectations the kurtosis consistently shows a strong co-movement with
the skewness.
For the sake of brevity, I report the policy rate and the skewness in the three areas in
Figure 6 the other statistics also document interesting features of s. In the United States
— top panel — the skewness gently increased by the second quarter of 1999, signalling that
markets were expecting a monetary tightening during the third quarter of 2000 the skewness
rapidly moved downwards, anticipating the start of the monetary easing cycle. In the euro
area — mid panel — the change in the skewness during 1999 were much more dramatic: it
increased from toin two months, signalling that markets wereunanimously expecting
a policy-rate increase. The euro area easing cycle of 2001 seems not to have been anticipated
by markets, which continued to show a zero skewness until January 2002. In the United
Kingdom — bottom panel — the rate increase of 1999 was not anticipated, as shown by
the skewness which lagged behind the policy-rate moves conversely, the rapid decrease in
skewness during the second half of 2000 shows that the tightening was largely expected.
The information content of the  statistics is evaluated by GMM-regressing the
monthly change in the 3-month interest rate on a set of variables, namely
 |   |3￿  !f  !￿  "#$|3&  !2     |3&  !￿      |3&
!e  "%&|3&  !D  '$#|3&  | (4)
for %  ,w h e r e  the 3-month rate, "#$ is difference between the 10- year
governmentbond yield and the 3-month rate,   isthe1-monthinterest rate, isthefutures
contract written on the 3-month rate with the closest expiration date, "%& the skewness of the
, '$# the ATM implied volatility.
Results (coefcients and t-statistics are presented in Table 1) document that the slope of
the yield curve is never signicant, except in the euro area in the euro area and in the UK
the difference between the spot and the futures (   ) is the most signicant variable in
explaining changes in short-term rates the slope of the term structure at the very short-term
(   ) is signicant in all of the three markets to different degrees. Among the statistics
obtained from the s ,t h es k e w n e s si sv e r ys i g n i cant in the euro area and in the UK, the
volatility only in the euro area neither in the US. The test on the joint signicance of the







($)"*) "#$         "%& '$# +2 *#
USA
   -0.09 0.02 -1.68 0.14 -0.02 0.03 0.59 0.70
(-0.37) (0.28) (-10.12) (2.15) (-0.38) (0.27)
   -0.33 0.06 -0.44 0.30 0.05 -0.09 0.28 0.34
(-1.98) (1.49) (-2.68) (3.55) (0.95) (-1.04)
   -0.45 0.12 0.62 1.48 -0.04 -0.18 0.21 0.40
(-1.32) (1.51) (1.18) (2.91) (-0.83) (-1.00)
   0.25 -0.05 -0.27 0.63 0.10 0.25 0.13 0.10
(0.96) (-0.96) (-1.14) (4.83) (1.62) (1.73)
euro area
   -0.17 0.08 -1.44 -0.09 -0.12 -0.05 0.63 0.05
(-1.30) (3.27) (-7.10) (-1.33) (-2.42) (-0.81)
   -0.39 0.07 -0.31 -0.36 0.21 -0.16 0.46 0.00
(-3.01) (2.33) (-1.70) (-5.20) (4.91) (-2.95)
   -0.86 0.16 0.78 -0.20 0.19 -0.38 0.36 0.00
(-5.64) (4.86) (4.32) (-2.45) (3.02) (-5.24)
   -0.63 0.12 0.89 0.27 0.10 -0.27 0.33 0.00
(-5.66) (4.13) (5.56) (4.24) (1.60) (-5.14)
UK
   0.01 0.02 -0.09 0.25 0.16 0.04 0.29 0.00
(0.05) (0.37) (-0.37) (1.57) (4.25) (0.36)
   -0.32 0.10 0.58 0.40 0.24 -0.16 0.34 0.02
(-1.77) (1.82) (4.36) (4.98) (2.49) (-1.41)
   0.30 -0.07 -0.27 0.07 0.17 0.21 0.12 0.01
(1.09) (-0.80) (-2.24) (1.28) (2.81) (1.21)
   0.51 -0.13 -0.13 0.28 0.16 0.36 0.12 0.04
(2.20) (-1.75) (-0.75) (2.19) (2.30) (2.41)
Monthly data coefcients and t-statistics (in brackets) of GMM estimates for the equation  |   |3￿  !f 
!￿"#$!2  |3&!￿  |3&!e"%&|3&!D'$#|3&| for%  ,
where  is the 3-month rate,"#$ the difference between the 10-year government bond yield and the 3-month rate, 
the 1-month rate, the futures contract on the 3-month rate with the closest expiration date, "%& the skewness of the
pdf,'$# the ATM implied volatility. Instruments are a constant and the same regressors with  % and  %  .Iu s e
the Hansen method to take into account overlapping observations. The column under the header ! reports the p-value for
the Wald test that!e  !D  .
Despite the small cross-section sample I also investigate the time series extracted from
the s around the monetary policy meeting. Figure 7 reports the cross-sectional average27
and median skewness from 40 business days before to 40 business days after the meetings
of the monetary authorities in the three areas, gathered according to the directive announced
in what follows, a tightening/steady/easing meeting is dened as one where an increase/no-
change/decrease is made. In the United States, the skewness around a tightening move is
steady around  and does not show a particular trend the average around a meeting where no
change is made is steady before the meeting and slightly decreasing afterwards the skewness
around an easing move is increasing until the meeting and accelerates thereafter. The only
clear trend is shown by the skewness around an easing meeting, which supports the hypothesis
of a mean-reverting process for market expectations. In the euro area, there is also no trend in
the skewness. The main difference with the US is that the skewness around an easing meeting
has negative values of around . In the United Kingdom the skewness around an easing
meeting shows an increasing trend after the meeting as in the United States no trend appears
in the other two lines.
In the three areas the skewness around a tightening meeting is largely positive, signalling
that markets, on average, correctly predict an increase in short-term rates it is either negative
or nil around an easing meeting but reverts soon after. In order to assess market expectation
movements around a meeting, I regress the cross-sectional average and median on a constant
and a trend results are shown in Table 5. The coefcients of the trend document that around
a meeting where a decrease is made the skewness tends to move upwards, while the trend
is uncertain around a tightening meeting for a neutral meeting the positive value of the
coefcient could be due to the extremely low level of interest rates during the sample period,
which made it reasonable to assume an upward move in the foreseeable future.
Table 5 also reports the p-value for a test of equality of the means before and after
monetary meetings of mean and median results show that there is a signicant difference
between means in almost all of the cases.
A caveat is in order. The averages are calculated on very small samples (for example
the increasing meetings for the United States are only six, the decreasing meetings eleven,
the steady meetings thirteen) and condence intervals are quite large. Only the condence
interval of average skewness — computed as plus and minus two standard errors — around a
tightening meeting does not contain the zero level in all the three areas.
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The use of s implied in futures options is extensively used by central banks to assess
market perceptions on future monetary moves. The analysis of the  makes it possible to
go beyond the simple point estimates provided by the futures contract for the chosen delivery
date since it provides condence intervals characterized by their skewness and probability of
extreme values. This paper aims to evaluate whether this application has a solid rationale.
The methodology applied to the monetary policy decisions taken in the United States, the euro
area and the United Kingdom from January 1999 to May 2002 shows that markets correctly
forecasted the monetary easing of 2001 in the United States in the course of the second half of
2000, but not for the euro area and the United Kingdom. The evidence for the tightening cycle
of 1999 is mixed: markets expected an increase in euro area policy rates at the beginning of
1999 expectations were less clear for the United States’ increases. In the case of the United
Kingdom the increase was not forecasted.
A cross-sectional analysis might have wider possibility of application but it is still at an
early stage given the small sample. However, preliminary results show that the time series














Date Directive deposit main renancing marginal
facility operations lending
xed variable facility
June 6, 2003 Decrease 1.00 2.00 3.00
March 7, 2003 Decrease 1.50 2.50 3.50
December 6, 2002 Decrease 1.75 2.75 3.75
November 9, 2001 Decrease 2.25 – 3.25 4.25
September 18, 2001 Decrease 2.75 – 3.75 4.75
August 31, 2001 Decrease 3.25 – 4.25 5.25
May 11, 2001 Decrease 3.50 – 4.50 5.50
October 6, 2000 Increase 3.75 – 4.75 5.75
September 1, 2000 Increase 3.50 – 4.50 5.50
June 28 (announced on 8 June*), 2000 Maintain 3.25 4.25 – 5.25
June 9, 2000 Increase 3.25 4.25 – 5.25
April 28, 2000 Increase 2.75 3.75 – 4.75
March 17, 2000 Increase 2.50 3.50 – 4.50
February 4, 2000 Increase 2.25 3.25 – 4.25
November 5, 1999 Increase 2.00 3.00 – 4.00
April 9, 1999 Decrease 1.50 2.50 – 3.50
January 22, 1999 Decrease 2.00 3.00 – 4.50
January 4, 1999 Maintain 2.75 3.00 – 3.25
January 1, 1999 Maintain 2.00 3.00 – 4.50








Date Directive Funds rate Discount rate Ofcial bias
June 25, 2003 Decrease 1.00 0.50 Easier
November 6, 2002 Decrease 1.25 0.75 Easier
March 19, 2002 Maintain 1.75 1.25 Neutral
January 29-30, 2002 Maintain 1.75 1.25 Easier
December 11, 2001 Decrease 1.75 1.25 Easier
November 6, 2001 Decrease 2.00 1.50 Easier
October 2, 2001 Decrease 2.50 2.00 Easier
September 17*, 2001 Decrease 3.00 2.50 Easier
August 21, 2001 Decrease 3.50 3.00 Easier
June 27, 2001 Decrease 3.75 3.25 Easier
May 15, 2001 Decrease 4.00 3.50 Easier
April 18*, 2001 Decrease 4.50 4.00 Easier
March 20, 2001 Decrease 5.00 4.50 Easier
January 31, 2001 Decrease 5.50 5.00 Easier
January 3-4*, 2001 Decrease 6.00 5.50 Easier
December 19, 2000 Maintain 6.50 6.00 Easier
June 27, 2000 Maintain 6.50 6.00 Inationary
May 16, 2000 Increase 6.50 6.00 Inationary
March 21, 2000 Increase 6.00 5.50 Inationary
February 2, 2000 Increase 5.75 5.25 Tighter
December 21, 1999 Maintain 5.50 5.00 Neutral
November 16, 1999 Increase 5.50 5.00 Neutral
October 5, 1999 Maintain 5.25 4.75 Tighter
August 24, 1999 Increase 5.25 4.75 Neutral
June 29-30, 1999 Increase 5.00 4.50 Neutral
May 18, 1999 Maintain 4.75 4.50 Tighter
February 2-3, 1999 Maintain 4.75 4.50 Tighter









Date Directive repo rate
May 5-6, 2004 Increase 4.00
November 5-6, 2003 Increase 3.75
July 9-10, 2003 Decrease 3.50
February 5-6, 2003 Decrease 3.75
November 7-8, 2001 Decrease 4.00
October 3-4, 2001 Decrease 4.50
September 18, 2001 Decrease 4.75
August 1-2, 2001 Decrease 5.00
May 9-10, 2001 Decrease 5.25
April 4-5, 2001 Decrease 5.50
March 7-8, 2001 Decrease 5.75
February 9-10, 2000 Increase 6.00
January 12-13, 2000 Increase 5.75
November 3-4, 1999 Increase 5.50
September 7-8, 1999 Increase 5.25
June 9-10, 1999 Decrease 5.00
April 7-8, 1999 Decrease 5.25
February 3-4, 1999 Decrease 5.50
January 6-7, 1999 Decrease 6.00Figure 3





Around the start of US monetary tightening (FOMC of 29/30 June 1999)




Around the start of US monetary easing (FOMC of 3 January 2001)




To the extent that agents are risk averse their true  may
differ from those shown and may be shifted to the right.
The  indicates the likelihood of a particular event occurring.
The probability of the 3-month eurodollar deposit rate being
X0.125 ticks is given by the area under the curve between
X+0.125 and X-0.125. The area under the whole curve is always 100%.Figure 4








Around the start of euro area monetary tightening (GC of 4 November 1999)




Around the start of euro area monetary easing (GC of 10 May 2001)




To the extent that agents are risk averse their true  may
differ from those shown and may be shifted to the right.
The  indicates the likelihood of a particular event occurring.
The probability of the 3-month eurodollar deposit rate being
X  0.125 ticks is given by the area under the curve between
X+0.125 and X-0.125. The area under the whole curve is always 100%.Figure 5






Around the start of UK monetary tightening (MPC of 7/8 September 1999)




Around the start of UK monetary easing (MPC of 7/8 March 2001)




To the extent that agents are risk averse their true  may
differ from those shown and may be shifted to the right.
The  indicates the likelihood of a particular event occurring.
The probability of the 3-month eurodollar deposit rate being
X  0.125 ticks is given by the area under the curve between
X+0.125 and X-0.125. The area under the whole curve is always 100%.Figure 6
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The three lines show the mean and the median of the skewness 40 business days before and 40 after monetary policy meetings
held at  according to the chosen directive the dashed line presents the mean/median skewness around a meeting when
an increase has been announced, the dotted line around a meeting when a decrease has been announced, the continuous line






















easing steady tightening easing steady tightening
USA constant -0.17WW 0.38WW 0.48WW 0.07WW 0.62WW 0.36WW
trend 0.00WW 0.00WW -0.00 0.00WW 0.00 0.00
test p-value 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.35 0.27
euro area constant -0.10WW 0.51WW 0.53WW -0.04WW 0.15WW 0.57WW
trend 0.00WW 0.00WW -0.00WW 0.00 0.00WW -0.00WW
test p-value 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00
UK constant 0.01 0.35WW 0.41WW 0.047WW 0.22WW 0.40WW
trend 0.00WW 0.00WW -0.00 0.00WW -0.00WW 0.00
test p-value 0.00 0.01 0.96 0.00 0.01 0.35
The table reports coefcients and t-statistics of the regression of the cross sectional mean and median of Figure 7 on a constant
and a trend. * (**) indicate that the coefcient is signcant at the 5 (1) per cent level. The rows with the ‘test p-value’ report
a test of equality of the mean: it is made by classifying the sample before and after the monetary meeting and is based on
a single-factor, between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) the row reports the p-value of a t-test with 79 degrees of
freedom: the null hypothesis that the sample means are equal is rejected at ! per cent for a p-value smaller than!.44&5
 &
Futures options are traded on the same exchanges as the underlying futures contract
and are executed and cleared with similar procedures as the underlying, the main differences
being the margining and resettlement practices. A distinction can be drawn between 
and 
	 futures options (Dufe 1989). The former give the buyer daily any change
in the futures option price in order to mark the buyer’s margin account. The latter require
the payment of the option premium when it is purchased and at exercise pays the buyer the
difference between the underlying and the strike price. Thus, a  futures option is not an
option at all, but rather a futures contract that delivers the corresponding 
	 option
on expiration. The futures options traded at the London International Financial Futures and
Options Exchange (LIFFE) have rulings that make them more like  than 
	
options. Futures options traded at CME are hybrids of these two categories. Thus, the 
futures option price is the forward price of the underlying option. If , is the European
type 
	 futures option price at time  with expiration at , its  futures option
equivalent price is ,83oEA3|￿  ,,w h e r e
 is the risk-free rate.
I collect daily quotes of end-of-day settlement prices of futures options written on 3-
month euro-currency interbank deposits denominated in US dollars, euros and sterling from
January 1999 to May 2004. US dollar 3-month interest-rate futures options are traded at the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), while euro and sterling 3-month interest-rate futures




" as well as from Thomson Financial Datastream.
At LIFFE, the American-type options are written on 3-month interest-rate futures
contracts on euro and sterling interbank deposits and have delivery months in March, June,
September, December — quarterly expiry months — and two serial months, so that ten expiry
months for the euro and six for the sterling are available for trading, with the nearest three
expiry months being consecutive calendar months. The last trading day is two business days
prior to the third Wednesday of the expiry month for both serial expiry months and quarterly
expiry months. The minimum price movement is 0.005 and the associated tick sizes and
values are euro 12.50 and £6.25 for the euro and sterling deposits, respectively. Strike price39
intervals are 0.25 but 0.125 for the rst four quarterly expiry months and for the serial expiry
months. As regards futures contracts, they are written onto the European Bankers Federations’
Euribor Offered Rate (EBF Euribor) for 3-month euro deposits and onto the British Bankers’
Association London Interbank Offered Rate (BBA LIBOR) for 3-month sterling deposits the
futures contract delivery month associated with each option expiry month is March in respect
of the January, February and March expiry months June in respect of the April, May and
June expiry months September in respect of the July, August and September expiry months
December in respect of the October, November and December expiry months.
At CME, the American-type options are written on the IMM index for the 3-month
‘Eurodollar Time Deposit’ futures contracts and have delivery months in March, June,
September, December — March quarterly cycle — and two serial months, so that eight expiry
months area available for trading, with the nearest three expiry months being consecutive
calendar months. The last trading day is two business days prior to the third Wednesday of the
expiry month at 7.00 on the day of exercise for both quarterly cycle and serial expiry months.
The strike price interval is 0.25 and 0.125 for some particular expiry months. There are three
minimum price movements, depending on the expiry month, 0.0025, 0.005 and 0.01 (one tick)
whose associated tick sizes and values are $6.25, $12.50 and $25.00, respectively. The IMM
index for 3-month ‘Eurodollar Time Deposit’ futures contracts underlying is the 3-month BBA
LIBOR on eurodollar deposits, with a principal value of $1,000,000, forty delivery months in
the March quarterly cycle, and the four nearest serial contract months.
In what follows we refer to policy rates in the three areas to the target federal funds rate
in the US, the rate on main renancing operations in the euro area, the repurchase agreement
rate in the UK. The 3-month interest rates are the 3-month EBF Euribor for euro-denominated
interbank deposits, the three 3 BBA LIBOR for dollar and sterling-denominated deposits.
policy-rate target changes are determined eight times per year by the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) in the United States, and every month by the General Council Meeting
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20 every month by the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) in the UK. Central
bank directives and policy rates are shown in Tables 1-3.
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